NavList:

Hello, Jeremy.

Thank you very much for your thoughts on this. Your many years experience in command of large ocean-going vessels is exactly the sort of expertise that NavList benefits from in discussions like this.

You wrote:
"Published wind and tidal current data show about a 1.5 knot flood current and about 10 knots of wind adding to this effect.  The ship was moving astern at 2.2 knots in the middle of the river but accelerated to 5.9 knots according to MarineTraffic AIS data at the time of the allision (see photo) and even after she was demasted and struck the park.  One video also showed astern wake along the quarters of the vessel as it passed under the bridge.  There was no evidence that any attempt was made to let go the anchor until the vessel was upstream of the Brookyln Bridge."

Yes, thank you for checking that detail. That's interesting about the acceleration as the ship crosses the river. Certainly the tidal current alone would not have been the cause then.

Nearly six knots at the time of impact! That's more than I had guessed. In other videos that have shown up later, it's fairly clear that the vessel is powered --clearly visible from the wake, as you note.

You listed some further thoughts:
"1) 2 tugboats.  The vessel only has a 1,200 HP engine, and working a barque in that current is hazardous.  The tugs should have remained tied to the vessel until positive confirmation of an ahead bell to maneuver the ship down the river."

That certainly makes sense. Tugs are plentiful around NYC, but I suppose prices are quite high nonetheless.

"2) Slack tide.  This operation should have been conducted at, or near slack tide to minimize the effects of current during the undocking."

And this is well-known in the East River. The section of the river just a short distance north of here wasn't named "Hell's Gate" as a joke! Currents are strong there (and yes, much of Hell's Gate was tamed by blasting and dredging, but still...).

"3) Anchors out of the hawse and ready to let go.  This should be standard operating procedure.  It probably wouldn't have saved them in this situation, but it would mitigate speed which minimizes damage"

This to me is the most puzzling element. If it's not standard procedure for Cuauhtemoc maneuvers, I suspect it will be in the near future.

"4) No one aloft: Given the close proximity of a low clearance bridge upstream during a flood tide this showboating display adds unnecessary risk to the operation."

This one is a pickle. The justification for the expense of sail-training vessels is certainly not what it says on the label; "sail training" is of little use, and basic cadet skills and military behaviors can be taught on boring little boats. These vessels exist as international port-visiting "diplomats". They are, in fact, "showboats". They put on a show including giant flags billowing in the breeze and sailors standing on the yardarms because that's what they're for. On the other hand, suffering from lifelong acrophobia, I say, "no thanks!" I'll stay down here on deck. I didn't join the navy to learn to fly!

"5) Testing the engine ahead and astern at the dock.  I don't know if this was part of their procedure, but if it wasn't done, it should have been."

We may hear more details on the actual failure in the future (but, as you say, being a naval vessel, maybe not). One detail that was reported by some media shortly after the incident was that the captain said that the rudder controls had failed. Did the captain say that? Maybe it was a second-hand report. But if he did, was there a common system here? Could the rudder have become frozen and the engine stuck in reverse from the same cause? Also, if the bridge crew became fixated on the rudder failure, could they have then failed to notice that the vessel was accelerating in reverse until it was too late?

Thanks again for your professional knowledge and contribution.

Frank Reed