NavList:

Tibor Miseta, you wrote:
"I agree with you that the decision to reverse the route, made months earlier, was fatal: they turned a difficult approach into an (almost) impossible one."

When Earhart flew solo across the Atlantic in 1932, her navigation was not precise, but she hit Europe. Obviously she and Noonan were aware that Howland Island is not as big as Europe. That tiny and absolutely indispensable target converted a manageable risk into a dangerous gamble. But they were apparently confident. They had "science" and the latest technology on their side.

Although we can temper our own comments as "hindsight", were there any navigators (or advisors to Earhart and Noonan) who noticed the obvious gamble that we see today? Any before the flight? During the attempted circumnavigation? Or even immediately after the flight? Flying towards a landmass like New Guinea from tiny Howland would have been risky but not a mortal gamble. Flying from New Guinea to the mid-ocean "dot" at Howland was ultimately a suicidal gamble. Was this radical asymmetry obvious to navigators in 1937?

Frank Reed